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Abstract 
This paper summarises research on the relative level of intergenerational mobility – whether 
classified by income, education or social class.  The literatures on education and income 
mobility reveal a similar ranking with South America, other developing nations, southern 
European countries and France tending to have rather limited mobility while the Nordic 
countries exhibit strong mobility.  Estimates of mobility based on social class point to rather 
different patterns, and we demonstrate that these differences are most likely generated by 
intergenerational earnings persistence within social classes.  The second part of the paper 
looks for explanations for the differences in earnings and education persistence and finds that 
mobility is negatively correlated with inequality and the return to education but positively 
correlated with a nation’s education spending.  
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1.  Introduction 
Intergenerational mobility is concerned with the relationship between the socio-economic 
status of parents and the socio-economic outcomes of their children as adults.  This can be 
measured in a variety of ways, by family income, individual earnings, social class, 
occupational status, or education. If most individuals’ socioeconomic outcomes are strongly 
related to those of their parents, this means that children from a poor family are likely to be 
relatively poor as adults and consequently that inequality will perpetuate. This has 
implications for economic efficiency if the talents of those from poorer families are under-
developed or not fully utilized, as those from poorer backgrounds will not live up to their 
productive potential. 
Most people would agree that equality of opportunity is an important goal; 
nonetheless it is difficult to imagine a world with no link between outcomes across 
generations. Genetic transmission alone is likely to lead to some positive association between 
the educational achievements, career prospects and earning power of parents and children, 
while learning within the family will accentuate the advantages of children from better-off 
families. Hence the policy implications of the study of intergenerational mobility are unclear. 
If intergenerational income inequality is solely a consequence of the automatic transmissions 
of ability and other attributes within the family, its reduction would require strong 
intervention by the state, and might lead to inefficiency. Our understanding of this can be 
improved by making comparisons of the levels of intergenerational mobility across countries. 
With such comparisons in hand, it is possible to assess mobility as ‘relatively weak’ and 
‘relatively strong’, and then to begin to consider potential explanations for differences in 
intergenerational mobility.  
 The first objective of this paper is to summarise the literature on the relative strength 
of intergenerational mobility across different countries.  In contrast to most other summaries, 
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work on earnings, education and social class will all be considered, with observations of 
mobility included from 46 countries.  The data requirements to measure the transmission of 
income or earnings are very strict so estimates are only available for a limited number of 
countries.  In addition there is considerable uncertainty about country rankings for those 
nations for which estimates are available (as highlighted in Björklund and Jäntti, 2009). For 
both these reasons it is helpful to supplement the estimates on income and earnings with 
those from the literatures on education and occupations.   
 We find that the results for earnings and education tend to be fairly well correlated; 
this implies that information on educational mobility is a good proxy for earnings mobility in 
countries where earnings information is not readily available.  Combined, the results indicate 
that South America and southern Europe have low mobility and the Nordic nations are rather 
more mobile.  
 International rankings of the association of social class across generations (social class 
fluidity) differ markedly from those for income and education. There are three possible 
explanations for this.  First, it could be that the true ranking is similar, but practical issues 
mean that measured rankings differ; we discuss the reasons why this might be the case.  
Secondly, it could be that social class and income/education are not well correlated; in this 
case the different approaches can be seen as complementary as they are based on different 
conceptual approaches. Finally, and most plausibly, (as suggested by the evidence) it could 
be that although social class and income are related there is a large amount of persistence 
within social classes for some nations, so that income matters for the life chances of the next 
generation even for those with the same parental class.  We demonstrate these relationships 
using data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the British 1970 birth 
cohort.   
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 In the final part of the paper we begin with a short review of the theoretical literature 
that seeks to model the determinants of intergenerational mobility within society.  This 
includes income inequality, educational investment, and returns to education.  Finally we take 
our preferred measures of mobility and correlate them with these variables. Earnings and 
education mobility are negatively related both to economic inequality and the returns to 
education but are positively related to education spending. 
 These descriptive correlations cannot be thought of as identifying the causal 
relationships that drive intergenerational mobility.  However, owing to the intense interest in 
the relationship between inequality and immobility, it seems worthwhile to explore the extent 
of our knowledge in this area.  The conclusions attempt to answer to the question: ‘How 
much can we learn from international comparisons of intergenerational mobility?’  
  
2. Measures and Concepts 
We begin by reviewing the key methodological issues that arise in obtaining estimates of 
income and earnings mobility, an issue that has achieved substantial attention in recent years.  
We then discuss the measures and concepts used when social status, class and education are 
used as outcome measures.  
2.1 Income Mobility 
A central tenet of economics is that individual welfare is best achieved by providing 
individuals with resources and allowing them to decide how to spend them.  Friedman’s 
(1957) permanent income hypothesis states that it is the permanent expectation of income 
that determines consumption and ultimate economic welfare. For economists therefore, the 
intergenerational relationship of interest is the relationship between parents’ permanent 
income and childs’ permanent income. As is common we denote permanent variables by * 
and logs by lower case variables. 
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Intergenerational mobility can be summarised by   from the following regression: 
* *
1ci pi iy y u     (1) 
  is therefore the elasticity of children’s income with respect to their parents’ income, 
giving the proportion of each 1% difference in parental income between families that will be 
passed on as an income difference between their children.
1
 Hypothetically, 0   represents a 
case of complete mobility where the incomes of parents and children are unrelated, and 1   
represents the case where the proportionate earnings advantage of parents is precisely 
mirrored in their children’s generation. Estimates of   tend to lie between 0 and 1, implying 
that an initial income advantage will decay over several generations.  
Economic mobility can be conceptualised either in terms of income or earnings but 
the literature is dominated by estimates of the elasticity of sons’ earnings with respect to 
fathers’ earnings.  This means that the importance of non-labour income is not 
acknowledged, those without paid employment are dropped and the experience of women as 
both mothers and daughters is mostly neglected (Chadwick and Solon, 2002, Raaum et al, 
2007, and Hirvonen, 2008, are notable exceptions regarding daughters).   As this paper is 
seeking comparable measures of mobility we follow the literature and focus on the earnings 
mobility of men, but other measures are also interesting, and they certainly deserve more 
widespread attention.  
 Ideally, one would like to measure earnings mobility in terms of permanent or long 
run income; however, most survey datasets that cover two generations only have short-term 
measures, although the use of administrative data from tax records can resolve the problem in 
some countries (so far these sources have been primarily exploited in the Nordic nations and 
                                                 
1
 This linear formation is common, but the literature is increasingly taking into account the impact of nonlinear 
relationships in earnings across generations. Bratsberg et al (2007) consider this issue in an internationally 
comparative context, while Björklund, Roine and Waldenström (2010) demonstrate strong income persistence 
for those with very high income parents in Sweden and Corak and Piraino (2010) stress the intergenerational 
correlation of employers as a possible explanation for the non-linearities they find in Canada.  
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Canada). Under classical measurement error assumptions
2
 it is straightforward to show that 
measurement error in the dependent variable (the son’s earnings) will not bias the estimate 
of  , although it will lead to a loss of precision and larger standard errors. As explained by 
Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), measurement error in the explanatory variable will 
lead to downward-biased and inconsistent estimates of  . 
The strategy for reducing the downward bias associated with measurement error used 
by Solon and Zimmerman is to average fathers’ earnings over several periods to better 
approximate permanent income. Under the classical measurement error model there will be a 
fall in the attenuating factor as more periods of data are used to generate the average.  
Work by Mazumder (2005) has shown that averaging fathers’ earnings over five years 
or so may not be sufficient to overcome measurement error because the observations are too 
close together to be representative of lifecycle income. Haider and Solon (2006) suggest that 
this is indicative of variation in the relationship between permanent income and current 
income through the lifecycle. As age-earnings profiles are steeper for those with higher 
permanent income, their income at young ages is low and their income at older ages is high, 
compared to their permanent income.  
Haider and Solon (2006) show that with this type of measurement error the direction 
of the bias is determined by the age at which earnings are observed.  Unlike in the classical 
case, measurement error in the dependent variable (sons’ earnings) will have an impact. The 
data used for intergenerational mobility often focuses on young sons and older fathers. Haider 
and Solon show that this combination is likely to lead to downward bias through both the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables, and possibly to substantial underestimation.  
Estimations of the relationship between current and permanent income reveal that incomes 
                                                 
2
 These assumptions are that permanent income is uncorrelated with the size of the measurement error, and that 
measurement errors are uncorrelated across generations (Zimmerman, 1992, footnote 9). 
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should be measured between the early 30s and mid 40s for the US. Similar results are found 
for Sweden and Germany (Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006 and Brenner, 2010).
3
  
An alternative solution to the classical measurement error problem is to use 
instrumental variables (IV). A valid IV is correlated with fathers’ permanent income but 
uncorrelated with measurement error. In addition it should not independently affect children’s 
economic status. The obstacle to using instrumental variables in this context is that almost 
every variable that is correlated with parents’ permanent income might also have an 
independent impact on sons’ status.  This leads to an upward bias in IV estimates of 
intergenerational persistence, so that they provide an upper bound on the true extent of 
intergenerational transmission in a country.  
 The standard measurement approach requires information on parental incomes and 
then children’s incomes twenty or thirty years later, this severely limits the number of 
countries for which we can estimate intergenerational mobility. The Two-Sample 
Instrumental Variable approach (TSIV) can be used when researchers have matched 
information on sons’ earnings and fathers’ characteristics (such as education and occupation) 
but no information on fathers’ earnings. Fathers’ earnings during the child’s teenage years are 
predicted using information on the relationship between earnings and education from other 
data from that period. Sons’ earnings are then regressed upon this prediction. Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997) first applied this approach to make comparisons for Sweden and the US, its 
increasing use has expanded the number of countries for which we have information on 
intergenerational income mobility.  
                                                 
3
 All the studies quoted show that current income underestimates permanent income in early career; this implies 
that intergenerational persistence is biased downwards for young sons.  Results for late career indicate stark 
differences between the US and European results.  In the US late career current income underestimates 
permanent income but in Sweden and Germany current income overestimates permanent income for older 
workers, implying that the impact of fathers’ age on estimates might vary across these nations.  
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Subject to certain assumptions, this estimator will be upward biased if an invalid 
instrument is used in the same way as for other IV estimators. As discussed by Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2007) the extent of the bias will depend upon the degree to which the instruments 
are directly related to the child’s income and the strength of their ability to predict father’s 
earnings.  The larger the R-squared in the first-stage regression the smaller the bias will be. 
More recently this approach has been extended to other nations, for example, Italy (Mocetti, 
2007, Piraino, 2007), France (LeFranc and Tannoy, 2005) and in the international 
comparisons by Grawe (2004) and Andrews and Leigh (2009) see Appendix Table 1 for more 
details and other studies.  
An alternative measure of intergenerational persistence is the correlation of parents’ 
and children’s incomes. This adjusts for differences in income variance between the two 
generations.   Mobility can be thought of as measured by 1-r.  
*
* * *
p cy , y
=Corr ( )
p
c
y
y
SD
r
SD
  
(2) 
The intergenerational correlation provides a measure of rank mobility between the 
generations, and provides an interesting comparison with the intergenerational elasticity.   As 
argued by Björklund and Jäntti (2009) it provides a measure which is not mechanically 
affected by changes in inequality across generations.  For example, Aaronson and Mazumder 
(2008) find a growth in the US intergenerational elasticity which mirrors changes in income 
inequality, but less similarity between trends in inequality and trends in the intergenerational 
correlation. Unfortunately very few measures of mobility include information on r alongside 
estimates of  .  In order to correctly estimate r  information on the inequality of permanent 
incomes in both generations is required.  These estimates are not readily available leading to 
a gap in the literature.  
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 In making international comparisons of intergenerational income mobility it is 
therefore essential to take account of the approach taken to measurement error and the age of 
fathers and sons. It would also be helpful to have information on both the intergenerational 
elasticity and correlation.  
 
2.2 Socio-Economic Mobility and Social Class Fluidity  
Measuring mobility by the statistical association of income or earnings across generations is a 
rather recent endeavour, with the majority of papers published since 1990.   Measurement of 
the links between fathers’ and sons’ social class or occupational status has a longer history.   
 One advantage of measuring intergenerational mobility by class or occupation is that 
the data requirements are less demanding. Retrospective information on father’s occupation 
does not require the investment in longitudinal data necessary for intergenerational income 
studies (although we may still have concerns about the quality of this information). We may 
also think that occupation, broadly defined, varies less over the lifecycle making age–related 
biases less problematic. Of course, in order to make international comparisons of mobility in 
social class or occupation across generations the measures used need to be comparable.  This 
is a huge undertaking and has led to some large-scale international projects and considerable 
controversy within the sociology discipline. 
 One approach to measuring mobility taken by sociologists is to create a socio-
economic index (SEI) for ranking occupations, match this index to fathers’ and sons’ 
occupations and then correlate this index across generations.  Generally the index depends on 
a weighted contribution of the average income and education within an occupation (where 
weightings are chosen to maximise the relationship between the prestige index and education 
and earnings). Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996, 2003, 2007a) have worked extensively on 
applying this approach across countries. These socio-economic indices can be correlated 
10 
 
across generations using similar approaches to those reviewed in the measurement of income 
mobility. The strength of these correlations can then be compared across countries.  
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2007b) provides the correlations which generate the results in 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2007a).  These give results for 43 countries over 9 cohorts and for 
three different levels of labour market experience. It is not, however, possible to formulate a 
robust picture of differences across countries from these data as the conclusions are highly 
dependent on the cohort and level of experience for which the correlation is calculated.
4
 In 
light of these difficulties we do not offer any further comment on this strand of the literature 
in this review.  
 As socio-economic indices are designed to be closely associated with education and 
income, then mobility in these measures clearly shares a conceptual basis with income and 
education mobility. An alternative approach to measuring mobility is based on class.   Class 
divisions are also based on occupation but are formed of broad occupational groupings, 
which are supposedly un-ordered. As expressed by Jonsson et al (2009, p. 977)  
 These classes are often assumed to convey a package of employment relations and 
consumption opportunities, a resulting social environment that structures behavior and 
decision making, and a culture that may be understood as an adaptation (or 
maladaptation) to this environment.    
Given this motivation behind the definition of social classes, it is not entirely obvious that 
class mobility will capture the same mechanisms as income mobility, although some 
evidence suggests that social class provides a good proxy for economic welfare (Goldthorpe 
and McKnight, 2006).   An aim of this review is to explore the links between mobility 
measured on different bases.  
                                                 
4
 This data provides correlations by nation, cohort and level of experience.  We might expect that 
intergenerational correlations for the same nation and cohort would be similar, however this does not appear to 
be the case. If we consider results for those joining the labour market between 1980 and 1985 the 
intergenerational SEI correlation at five years experience has a 0.06 correlation with the same correlation at 15 
years experience and a correlation of 0.30 with the same measure at 25 years of experience. These figures are 
based on 18 countries, the greatest number available for this type of comparison.  
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A frequently used schema is the EGP classification based on Erikson et al (1979) and 
shown in Table 1. It focuses on aggregating occupations according to the employment 
conditions they experience. 
5
 As social class is not a continuous variable, the measurement of 
social class fluidity (as it is commonly called) is based on the analysis of two-way 
contingency tables which document the moves between classes across generations.   
Modelling the patterns of mobility in contingency tables is a more difficult enterprise than 
correlating continuous variables and a large literature has evolved on how this can best be 
achieved.  The major difficulty stems from the fact that structural class shifts between 
generations will necessarily force some families away from the diagonal; increasing the 
appearance of absolute mobility.  As a consequence it is important to have a measure of 
relative mobility which is invariant to compositional changes across generations.  
 Odds ratios provide one measure of relative mobility. For a contingency table with 
two origin and two destination classes, the relative association between classes across 
generations is 11 22
12 21
( )
F F
F F


 where ijF is the frequency of observations in cell ij where i and j  
index father’s and son’s classes respectively. Each set of four cells in a larger contingency 
table will generate an odds ratio, taken together these provide a complete description of the 
patterns of mobility in the data.   Log linear models provide a related, but more parsimonious, 
way of describing the total pattern of mobility in a contingency table.  
If we take as the dependent variable the expected ijF , in other words the frequency of 
observations with origin class i and destination class j, then this can be explained by a scaling 
parameter μ, the influence of the origin class, i , the influence of the destination class, j , 
(the effects of both origin and destination classes are represented by a categorical variable for 
                                                 
5
 Jonsson et al (2009) provide an alternative approach to measuring mobility based on taking occupations as a 
unit in themselves.  As this approach is only beginning to be used to measure international comparisons we shall 
not consider this further here, but rather mark this new literature as ‘one to watch’.  
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each class) and the influence of the association between origins and destinations for this 
particular cell, ij , (modelled by dummy variables capturing the interaction effects).  
Therefore ij i j ijF    for all i and j.  
If we take logs of this model it becomes linear 
ln O D ODij i j ijF         (3) 
In this way the model is fully saturated by the inclusion of dummies for origin (superscript 
O), destination (superscript D) and full interaction effects (OD), so the frequencies in each 
cell will be predicted perfectly. In a model of perfect relative mobility the ODij terms will be 
equal to zero.  The aim of log linear modelling is to avoid including all the ODij  terms but 
still achieve an acceptable fit for the model.  The ODij terms omitted depend on the particular 
pattern of mobility the researcher has in mind, models depicting different mobility schemes 
can be evaluated depending on how well they fit the observed data. For more detail on the 
precise nature of these models see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) or Breen (2004). 
 When a cross country approach is taken a third dimension is added to the model, k.  In 
this case ijkF is the frequency of observations with origin class i and destination class j in 
country k. If the researcher believes that association effects are common across countries the 
log linear model becomes where 
DC
jk and 
OD
ij are represented by dummies for origin and 
destination class in each country.  
ln O D C OC DC ODijk i j k ik jk ijF               (4) 
A way of measuring variations in fluidity across nations is to examine how well this model 
performs; if it provides a good fit then this indicates that variation in the extent of class 
associations across countries is limited.   Models allowing variations in the extent of 
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particular origin-destination effects across countries enable a more complex pattern of 
similarities and differences to be investigated.  
 Erikson and Goldthorpe’s book The Constant Flux compared the extent of class 
fluidity for a number of countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The study initially 
concentrated on Europe with England and Wales, France, Northern Ireland, Scotland, the 
Republic of Ireland, West Germany, Sweden, Poland, and Hungary all examined closely. 
Analysis was also added for Czechoslovakia, Italy, the Netherlands the United States, 
Australia, and Japan.   More recently Breen (2004) has followed up this study with an 
analysis of 11 countries, with significant overlap with those included by Erikson and 
Goldthorpe. Breen’s aim is to understand trends in mobility for these countries from the 
1970s onwards.   In this literature the time period refers to the point at which sons’ 
occupations are measured; all of the data from a national general purpose survey is used so 
that these studies do not generally focus on a particular birth cohort. 
 The models estimated in both of these books produce a very large number of 
parameters, and a great deal of detail on mobility patterns. It is one of the disdvantages of the 
social class literature that there is not a more intuitive summary measure of mobility; for the 
purpose of this summary we would benefit greatly from a single mobility parameter for each 
nation and point in time, which could be easily compared with the measures for income and 
education mobility. Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) UniDiff model provides the nearest to 
such a statistic that is available. 
ln O D C OC DC OD ODijk i j k ik jk ij k ijF                  (5) 
As before the interaction terms in 
OD
ij  depict the pattern of association between origin and 
destination class, the coefficient k allows this association to be generally larger in some 
countries than others, but does not allow for differential variation in the different components 
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of ODij . k  is normalised to some baseline so that a relatively high k  indicates relatively 
low mobility and a low k indicates high mobility.   
 This has necessarily been a very brief introduction to measuring social class fluidity.  
However it should give some intuition about the processes involved in the complex world of 
log linear modelling, and give an overview of how these methods have been used to make 
comparisons across countries.   
 
2.3 Educational Persistence across Generations 
An alternative measure of mobility is the extent to which parents’ and children’s education 
levels are related.  The literatures on intergenerational income and social class or status 
persistence emphasise the role of education as a transmission mechanism; it seems natural to 
measure this association directly.  
 As with occupation, information on educational achievements across generations is 
quite widely available.  Once again there are difficulties in ensuring that education has the 
same meaning across countries. One approach is to measure education in years of schooling, 
assuming that the meaning of this variable is constant across nations and generations.  In this 
case educational persistence can be measured using the intergenerational coefficient and 
correlation, similar to the approach used for income mobility.  
2
children parents
i i iYearsEd YearsEd u     
and parents childYearsEd , YearsEdCorr ( )
parents
child
YearsEd
YearsEd
SD
SD
  
(6) 
(7) 
Cross national comparisons and 50 year trends in the coefficient and correlation of years of 
schooling have recently been reported by Hertz et al (2007) for 42 nations. While the data is 
not perfect, sometimes relying on relatively small samples, it is informative to have such a 
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broad sample of nations and we draw heavily on this work when we come to summarise the 
international findings.   
 A weakness in Hertz et al’s approach is that it assumes (as does the measurement of 
income mobility, as presented here) that the impact of years of education on the next 
generation is linear and monotonic.   It seems unlikely that this will be true, and even more 
unlikely that this will be true in all countries.
6
  As an example, the structure of the UK 
schooling system means that it is inappropriate to estimate simple years of schooling effects 
on earnings (Dearden et al, 2002).  To overcome this problem we might wish to consider 
education in terms of qualification levels.   This is more demanding in terms of cross-national 
comparability.  Chevalier et al (2009) use the UNESCO designed ISCED classification as the 
basis of the five-category coding of education to measure the intergenerational association of 
education in Europe and the US.   In Appendix Figure 1 we compare the results from 
Chevalier with those from Hertz and find a moderate correlation of 0.49, implying common 
ground between the two approaches.
7
  
 
3. Is there a consensus? 
3.1 Income Mobility 
The comparison of intergenerational income elasticities has become a fairly well-travelled 
path. Solon (2002), Corak (2006), d’Addio (2007) and Björklund and Jäntti (2009) all draw 
together the international evidence on earnings mobility. The introduction to income mobility 
provided in Section 2 has outlined the crucial measurement issues which can cause estimates 
of income mobility to be biased.  It is essential that the estimates of mobility chosen for 
                                                 
6
 This weakness is not shared by the log-linear approach to social class fluidity which allows complete 
flexibility in the relationship between different social classes across generations.  
7
 There is also a large literature on educational inequalities in sociology, however this focuses for the most part 
on the relationship between origin social class and educational attainment. Breen and Jonsson (2005) provide a 
review of cross-country comparisons and conclude that ‘there is only scattered knowledge about how different 
contemporary countries “rank” in terms of inequality of educational attainment’ (p. 227).  
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different countries are similar in their approach to measurement error and the age at which 
income is measured for each generation.  In addition, as income mobility may change over 
time it is important that comparisons are made for cohorts as close in birth date as possible. 
The estimates preferred here are for cohorts born in the late 1950s or early 1960s.  Most of 
these focus on the earnings of fathers’ and sons’ in mid-career, however we might worry that 
sons in Solon’s US work (aged 25-34), in the UK (aged 33) and in the Canadian study quoted 
(aged 29-32) are slightly on the young side, given our comments on lifecycle bias.    
 The selected estimates are listed in Table 2.  They are based on three techniques, OLS 
using a time average of fathers earnings (based on around 5 years of data), instrumental 
variables (IV) or two-sample instrumental variable (TSIV).  As discussed in the methodology 
section, we would expect the IV estimates to be upward biased compared to those based on 
OLS.  Here I follow Corak (2006) in scaling down the IV estimates to make them more 
comparable.  This is done on the basis of the bias detected in Solon (1992) and Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997), in both cases the OLS estimates based on time averaging in US PSID are 
smaller than those based on IV approaches by a factor of 0.75.  It is a strong assumption to 
carry across this bias to other countries, but seems preferable to leaving the estimates 
uncorrected.
8
    
 For the UK Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) uses IV approaches for the 1958 
cohort to get an estimate of 0.58, this is scaled down to give 0.44, but even this is high 
compared to Ermisch and Nicoletti’s (2007) estimate from the British Household  Panel 
Study, which is 0.29 for the relevant cohort.  In order to recognise the fact that ‘There is a lot 
of uncertainty about the UK’ (Björklund and Jäntti, 2009) we average the two estimates to 
give our preferred figure.  This is in contrast to other surveys; Solon (2002) and Corak (2002) 
                                                 
8
 Another concern is that the bias may differ for different combinations of instruments. In our favour is that 
Solon (1992) uses only the father’s years of education, while Björklund and Jäntti (1997) use his education and 
occupation, the scaling factors from the two papers is the same.  Zimmerman (1992) uses the Duncan 
occupational index and finds a similar difference between the results based on time-averaging and IV.  For full 
details of the instruments used in the studies selected here see Appendix Table 1.  
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rely exclusively on Dearden, Machin and Reed, while Björklund and Jäntti (2009) prefer 
Ermisch and Nicoletti’s estimate.  
 Figure 1 provides a visual comparison of our preferred estimates of intergenerational 
income persistence.  Twelve countries are represented, which is small compared to the 
number of countries with information on education mobility. While it is tempting to 
immediately form the estimates into a ‘league table’ we must pay attention to the size of the 
standard errors; these are large in many cases.    Although it does seem to be the case that the 
Nordic nations have higher mobility, it is impossible to statistically distinguish the estimates 
for Sweden and the US. The appropriate ranking at the top end is difficult to detect with large 
standard errors for the Australian, French, British and US estimates making it unclear how 
these countries should really be ranked.  We should also consider the impact of lifecycle bias, 
which might downward bias results for the US, UK and Canada.  A resulting downward bias 
would not change the general ranking for the US and UK very much (as they are towards the 
high persistence end) but it is possible that mobility in Canada is overstated by the results 
listed here. 
 Brazil sticks out clearly at the top of the graph as having low mobility (which is quite 
precisely measured).  This is our first evidence that there may be stark differences between 
estimates of mobility for developed and developing countries or across different regions of 
the world.  Grawe (2004) considers mobility for a broader range of countries and finds 
persistence in Ecuador, in particular, to be far higher than any estimate for developed 
countries.   
 
3.2 Social Class Fluidity 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) provide an analysis of international comparisons of social 
class fluidity for the 1970s which has been recently updated in Breen (2004). The discussion 
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of cross national similarities and differences in both Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and 
Breen (2004) is incredibly rich with a great deal of detail concerning the extent of mobility 
between particular classes.  
 Both studies also provide summary measures from the UniDiff model.  These are 
included here in Figures 2 and 3.
9
  In the earlier study the average extent of mobility is 
normed to 0 while in Breen this normalisation is on 1.    Our discussion of mobility so far has 
indicated notable differences between the Nordic nations and the US.  As discussed by 
Björklund and Jäntti (2000) and revealed clearly in Figure 2 Sweden and US both appear to 
be rather high mobility nations when measured by social class in the 1970s.
10
 Germany has 
the least mobility in Breen (2004) and is among the lower mobility nations in Erikson and 
Goldthorpe (the sample of comparator countries is rather different); this is in contrast to our 
earlier results for income mobility for which Germany looks rather mobile.  As Erikson and 
Goldthorpe consider mobility for all sons in the 1970s they include those born several 
decades before the 1960s; the main cohort considered for our summary measure of income 
mobility.  
 Breen updates the UniDiff model up to the 1990s, again selecting all adult males 
rather than a particular cohort.  His results for the most recent time period are given in the 
final bar for each country in Figure 3.  Once again we observe differences between these 
results and those for income mobility, with Germany being the least mobile country. There 
are clearly some striking differences between international rankings of mobility depending on 
whether they are measured by income or social class.   
                                                 
9
 In contrast to the other measures of mobility we do not have standard errors available  to add to these graphs, 
so we are not able to comment on their precision.   There is possible to obtain standard errors using maximum 
likelihood estimation (see Turner and Firth, 2008) and it would be useful if this became standard practice in this 
literature.    
10
 However Erikson and Goldthorpe urge caution due to measurement problems in the US data and assert that 
this may over-state the extent of mobility in this nation; ‘the true position of the United States in the rank order 
should be seen as lying much closer to that of England’ (p.382, footnote 8) . Acknowledgement of this would 
shift the US towards the middle, but there is no suggestion that the US is particularly immobile in social class.  
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3.3 Educational Persistence across Generations 
Hertz et al (2007) measure the intergenerational association using years of education for a 
large number of countries and results for both the regression coefficient and correlation are 
provided in Table 3, with a graphical representation of the correlations in Figure 4.  The first 
striking result is that Hertz et al (2007) find confirmation of two results found for income 
mobility; that intergenerational mobility is low in South America and high in the Nordic 
nations. Of the western nations, Italy and the US are the least mobile as measured by the 
intergenerational correlation in years of education.  Great Britain is immobile when measured 
by the regression coefficient but mobile when measured by the correlation.  This difference 
stems from the low variability in years of schooling for parents in the sample (almost 
everyone left at the end of compulsory schooling). For the full sample of countries the 
correlation between the coefficient and correlation is 0.40. 
  
3.4 What are the similarities and differences? 
Throughout our selected summaries of the income, social class, status and education mobility 
literature, we have made comments on the ways in which the measures and rankings have 
pointed towards common patterns of mobility across nations and we have also drawn 
attention to stark differences in the implications of these literatures for particular countries.   
 Table 4 provides an overall picture of the similarities and differences in the different 
measures by listing the correlation coefficients between them.  In many cases the sample of 
countries used do not overlap very much resulting in rather small sample sizes, we therefore 
would not want to over-emphasise these results.  One thing that is very clear is that while the 
measures of income and education links across generations tend to be positively correlated 
(also shown in Figure 5) this is not the case for the measures of social class fluidity.   It 
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appears that these constructs are tapping into rather different mechanisms. Note that the two 
measures of social class fluidity are closely linked for the eight countries for which both are 
available; this is true eventhough they relate to different periods.  In the next section we will 
attempt to explain how differences in rankings between different measures can come about.  
 
4. Reconciling different measures of mobility 
4.1 Measurement and Data Quality 
Before exploring the conceptual reasons why measures based on social class might differ 
from those based on income or education it is first important to assess whether prosaic 
differences in data or measurement might be driving the divergent results. 
 Section 2.1 described the difficulties in obtaining solid measures of intergenerational 
earnings persistence.  These primarily stem from difficulties in acquiring the necessary long 
term data (a problem which can be solved by making use of two-sample methods) and 
problems in ensuring that the measures used are not subject to measurement error or lifecycle 
bias. This review has taken care not to allow differential measurement error to affect the 
comparisons, but as we have seen there is a possibility that lifecycle bias may be influencing 
the position of Canada in our comparisons.  One issue that is less stressed in the context of 
intergenerational income mobility is whether income has the same relationship to the 
standard of living in each country; we might think that this relationship is weaker in countries 
with extensive welfare provision. The data reveals low persistence in the Nordic nations 
which are characterised by large welfare states; however it seems unlikely that this is 
concealing strong persistence in true welfare in these nations. We might also worry about the 
impact of compensating wage differentials and price variation (Björklund and Jäntti, 2000); 
and it could be that some of the strong mobility in the US is likely to reflect geographic 
diversity (although Aaronson and Mazumder, 2008, argue that this is not the case).  
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 It is perhaps more straightforward to obtain information on the occupation and 
education of two generations through surveys than it is to obtain this information on income. 
However, we still face the challenge of ensuring that the variables obtained are a good 
measure of permanent status.  We might expect that adult education is less subject to change 
than occupation, but it should be noted that increasing numbers of adults are engaging in 
lifelong learning to improve their education level.  The sociology literature has generally 
been quiet about the impact of intra-generational changes in social class on the validity of 
international comparisons.  Again, as career change becomes more common this lacuna 
becomes more difficult to justify.  
 Both the social class and income mobility literatures (as presented here) take very 
little account of the role of mothers.  Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) justify the use of 
father’s social class as the origin status by arguing that although participation has increased, 
women’s attachment to the work-force, the continuity of their work history and their 
contribution to family incomes has remained substantively unchanged. While this might be 
the case in the 1970s and 1980s, the validity of these assertions is becoming increasingly 
dubious in the wake of the women’s increasing contributions to household income11 and the 
growing number of families with no male head (see ONS, 2007, for figures for UK).  This 
limitation is not found in the Hertz et al (2007) study of educational mobility which measures 
parental education as the average of mother’s and father’s education whenever possible12.  
 As has already been noted, sociologists take the construction of comparable class 
measures very seriously (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) in spite of this we may still have 
concerns about the comparability of measures across countries.  While it should be relatively 
straightforward for respondents to list their own or their father’s occupation, it is a harder job 
                                                 
11
 Fry and Cohn (2010) show that among prime-age couples in the US 22% of wives now earn more than their 
husbands, compared to just 4% in 1970).  
12
 With information on father’s education available in 87% of usable cases and information on mother’s 
education available for 92% of these cases, it seems that the great majority of observations of parental education 
will be based on the average (Hertz, 2007, footnote 8).  
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to code these occupations into classes with the same meaning across nations.  Changes in 
occupational structures across time add an additional dimension; can we be confident that the 
classifications are being adapted equally well across nations?  We may also be concerned that 
the meaning of different education levels might vary across nations, but here there is less 
room for the subjectivity of the coder as data on years of education is used in the same form 
as it was recorded.  
 Given these comments we can see a number of practical reasons why the results for 
income/education and social class might differ. The fact that two of our measures yield a 
similar pattern leads us to look for reasons why the social class measures are unreliable. It 
could be that comparable occupation coding is too difficult to achieve; or that results are 
influenced by differing rates of intragenerational class mobility between nations; or that the 
neglect of the role of mothers means that the social measures do not show the full picture.  
However, it should be noted all of these criticisms can also be directed at either the income or 
education approaches.  It is possible the combination of all these factors has a more profound 
effect on social class but there is no compelling reason why this should be so.  An alternative 
explanation is that there are genuine conceptual differences in the rankings and it is to these 
that we now turn.  
 
4.2 Conceptual Differences 
Take first the relationship between measured intergenerational persistence in income and 
education. For the purposes of this exposition we shall assume all variables are measured 
perfectly.  
Recall the linear model of intergenerational income mobility in equation (1): 
* *
1ci pi iy y u       
For each generation education has a return in the labour market so that  
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*
pi p p pi piy Ed v     (the R-squared for this model is 
2
EdpR ) 
and *
ci c c ci ciy Ed v    .  
(8) 
 
(9) 
 is the coefficient on parents’ education in a regression of child’s education. It can be easily 
shown that the relationship between   and  is:  
*
2 2 2
( , ) ( , )1
( )* *(1 ) . *
( ) ( )
pici ci pic
Edp Edp Edp
p pi p pi
Cov y v Cov v Ed
R R R
Var v Var Ed

 
 
     
(10) 
The first term is the extent of intergenerational persistence in income and earnings if 
education were the only route for intergenerational transmission.  This relationship is 
moderated by the relative size of returns to education. In addition, it is affected by the size of   
2
EdpR , if education and income are closely associated then there will be closer relationship 
between mobility based on the two measures. The second term is the impact of the 
relationship between within-education group inequalities in parental income and the child’s 
income while the third term is the cross effect between parental education and the child’s 
residual earnings.  It is clear that while income and education persistence are likely to have a 
positive correlation there are other components which will lead to this correlation being less 
than one.  One important element of this is the influence of differences in parental income 
among parents with the same level of education. 
 The same framework can be used to express the relationship between social class 
mobility and income mobility.  Once again we need to define the returns to social class in 
each generation, where Soc is a set of categorical variables in the EGP tradition.  
*
pi p p pi piy Soc      with an R-squared of
2
SocpR  (11) 
*
ci p c ci ciy Soc      (12) 
As noted in the review of the social fluidity literature, there is no obvious summary measure 
of  social class fluidity, and in addition the categorical nature of social class means we are 
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unable to estimate a single return parameter for each generation. Instead we combine these 
two elements and think of the decomposition as a function of the elasticity between income 
predicted on the basis of social class rather than social class persistence itself.   
*
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
* *(1 ) *
ˆ ˆ( )( ) ( )
p pi c ci ci pi ci p pi
k Socp Socp Socp
pip pi p pi
Cov Soc Soc Cov y Cov Soc
R R R
VarVar Soc Var Soc
    

 
     
(13) 
 
Björklund and Jäntti (2000) assert that differences in the extent of mobility by income and 
social class can be explained by the extent to which income not explained by social class is 
transmitted across generations. Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2010) make a similar 
argument about the relationship between social class fluidity and income mobility in the UK; 
asserting that the transmission of income inequality within classes is essential to explaining 
why the UK has become more immobile on the basis of income at the same time as social 
class mobility was unchanged (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2010).   
 Our literature review indicated more coherence between the income and education 
results compared to those that measure persistence in social class. The decomposition 
provides several possible explanations for this. First the decomposition shows that the 
association between the parameters is affected by the R-squared term. All else equal, 
different mobility indices will tell a similar story if the measures used to form them are 
strongly related. In addition, it could be that within social-class transmissions of income are 
stronger than within-education group income transmissions. If this is true it implies that 
education explains more of what matters for the economic success of the next generation than 
social class does.  
 
4.3 Comparison for the US and UK 
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Although we will never be able to entirely settle the question of whether results based on the 
different approaches differ for conceptual or measurement reasons, a consideration of 
different measures within the same dataset is useful for two reasons.  First, it provides some 
confirmation that the international rankings for different measures are not entirely spurious; 
driven perhaps by the use of different data sources.  Second, it allows the demonstration of 
how the decompositions described above are able to reconcile different estimates and 
rankings.
13
 
 To investigate we explore two of the commonly used data sets; the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US and the 1970 British Cohort Study.  We use the 
comparable datasets generated for Blanden, Haveman, Smeeding and Wilson (2010) which 
examine the relationship between sons’ earnings and total parental income, and merge in 
information on fathers’ and sons’ education in years and class for both generations (see notes 
to Table 6 for more details).   
 The rankings of the UK and US on income and education mobility are comparable to 
those shown in the literature review, despite the use of parental income rather than fathers’ 
earnings.  The elasticity between sons’ earnings and parental income is 0.27 for the UK and 
0.48
14
 for the US. In Table 2 our preferred estimates are 0.37 and 0.41.   For the education 
measure we relate standardised
15
 years of education across generations and obtain 
coefficients of 0.35 for the UK and 0.47 for the US, these results are consistent with the 
correlations found in Hertz et al, which are 0.31 for the UK and 0.46 for the US.  
                                                 
13
 A similar approach is used by Hertz et al  (2007) who use it to compare findings on education and income 
mobility in the PSID.  
1414
 Blanden, Haveman, Smeeding and Wilson (2010) report a lower estimate of intergenerational income 
mobility for the US, based on slightly different sample selection decisions.  However, the US-UK ranking is the 
same in this case.  
15
 Standardisation moderates the very narrow distribution of education among UK fathers which would 
otherwise distort the results. The bivariate regression coefficient between two standardised variables is identical 
to the correlation.  
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 The results given in Table 5 show how the findings for income and education relate to 
one another according to the decomposition given in equation (10). Of a difference of .18 in 
estimated intergenerational income persistence about one third can be accounted for by the 
difference in education persistence.  The majority of the greater income persistence in the US 
is due to income transmissions that occur within parental education groups.  
 We repeat this exercise comparing the income and social class results, showing the 
results in Table 6. The elasticity of the social class components for the UK is 0.36 and 0.31 
for the US.  Even though this does not precisely measure persistence in class, these results are 
consistent with the findings of the literature review which showed less mobility in social class 
for the UK; a reversal of the results for income and education.  As noted above, this could 
reflect a closer relationship between income and education compared to income and social 
class, but this is not the case here; rather more of the variance of parental income is explained 
by father’s social class than by father’s education.  Instead, Table 6 shows that the within-
class components drive all of the stronger income mobility in the US.  
 The headline results in Tables 5 and 6 are exactly what we would expect given the 
findings of the literature review; estimates of mobility diverge more for social class and 
income than they do for education and income. However, this is not because education 
provides a better proxy for income but rather because of more persistent within-social class 
income differences in the US.  Social class and education are similarly correlated with 
parental income, but in the US at least, social class does not have the same effect on the 
economic prospects of the next generation. This could be for a number of reasons, perhaps 
because individuals with the same level of education are more similar in the ways they invest 
in their children than those with the same social class, or because parental education is a 
better predictor of childhood socio-economic status than fathers’ social class is. It is also 
possible that the greater importance of within-group income differences in the US could be 
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generated by less measurement error in income relative to social class there than in the UK; 
we cannot altogether dismiss issues of data quality. 
 So what should we take away from this discussion? Should we conclude that results 
based on income and education are preferable to those based on social class?  Or should 
results be selected depending on whether the reader is primarily interested in economic status, 
or the broader concept of social status as measured by social class. Although there are 
undoubted difficulties with social class as a measure, this is also true of the income and 
education measures used, and consequently it does not seem correct to dismiss measure of 
social class mobility as inherently poorer.  The analysis here indicates that there is real 
variation across countries in the extent to which parental income and father’s social class 
predict later outcomes, indicating that the two have different, but arguably equally valid, 
conceptual bases.  
 
 5. Explaining patterns in income and education mobility  
This paper has so far provided a (selective) review of the literature on international 
comparisons of intergenerational mobility and found some common themes in the story 
presented by the different approaches. The next step is to try to explain the differences 
between nations. We first review the theoretical perspectives that have been taken on this 
question before considering some evidence from a cross-country comparison.  Our findings 
so far encourage us to use the income and education measures of mobility here as these share 
more common ground. We are conscious of the limitations of this cross-country approach, 
and use our findings to motivate future directions for this research agenda.  
 Becker and Tomes (1986) provide the original economic model of intergenerational 
income mobility.  The framework is based on the idea that parents make optimal financial 
investments in their children. In a model where parents and children have perfect access to 
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credit markets there will be no direct relationship between parental income and investments.  
Any relationship between incomes across generations will be driven entirely through the 
inheritance of characteristics rewarded in the labour market (labelled endowments). Public 
policy can lead to an increase in mobility in two ways, by making investments in less-
favoured children (weakening heritability) and by financing higher education to ameliorate 
the effect of credit constraints.  As pointed out by Goldberger (1989) the investment 
argument is only valid if public and private investments are substitutes in the production of 
human capital, if the two are complementary then public investments can reduce mobility.  
 Solon (2004) builds on the Becker-Tomes framework and provides an economic 
model which explains intergenerational mobility as a function of parental and public 
investments in children. He shows that intergenerational income persistence will be higher if 
heritability is higher, if the productivity of investment in education is higher, if the returns to 
education are higher and if government investment in human capital is less progressive.   
Solon also shows that the same parameters are important for generating income inequality so 
that inequality and intergenerational persistence will tend to have a positive relationship.  
 We might also think of other more direct connections between inequality and 
mobility. If the distribution of income is wider in country A than country B children at the 
bottom may be relatively more disadvantaged in country A and will face greater barriers to 
upward movement.  The desire to improve intergenerational mobility in the UK is one motive 
for policies that aim to eradicate child poverty. 
 The preceding discussion leads us to focus on two broad dimensions by which 
countries may differ and which may help to explain differences in the extent of mobility; 
inequality and education (both investments in and returns from).  It should be noted from the 
outset that there are strong connections between inequality, educational returns and 
educational investments, which will make it difficult to disentangle the differential 
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importance of these effects.  Both the Solon and Becker models illustrate clearly that 
increases in the return to education will increase inequality, and this is shown empirically by 
Katz and Autor (1999) for the US and Machin (1998) for the UK.   
 The extent and progressivity of educational investments are also likely to be 
influenced by the degree of inequality with society; the direction of the effect will depend on 
where political power is located.  If power resides with the median voter then greater 
inequality may lead to more redistributive spending (Romer, 1975), but if it resides with the 
economic elite then the reverse might be the case (Burtless and Jencks, 2005).  Educational 
investments are naturally likely to depend on the returns that they yield, adding yet another 
layer of interrelation.  As well as interactions between the explanatory variables it is also 
possible that some of the explanators are endogenous with respect to intergenerational 
mobility, for example, if intergenerational mobility is low the state may try to improve it by 
making progressive investments in education.  In the remainder of the paper we shall 
correlate measures of inequality, public educational investment and private educational 
returns with our preferred measures of income and education persistence, keeping in mind the 
difficulties of interpretation discussed above.    
 
5.1 Cross Sectional Income Inequality 
The relationship between mobility and inequality is of considerable interest.  The American 
Dream is based on the hypothesis that inequality is less of a concern if it is coupled with high 
mobility. If greater inequalities go hand-in-hand with fewer opportunities it is much more 
alarming. Our basic picture of Nordic countries at the top of the mobility ranking and South 
America at the bottom certainly points towards a negative correlation between the two. This 
relationship has also been demonstrated internationally by Corak (2006), Björklund and Jäntti 
(2009) and Andrews and Leigh (2009) while Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) demonstrate a 
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close positive relationship over time between US inequality and the intergenerational 
elasticity.  We check that this holds in the countries we have here, but our innovation lies in 
experimenting with using different measures of inequality and child poverty.  
 Our inequality measures are predominantly taken from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) which provides cross-nationally comparable estimates for various measures of 
income inequality and child poverty.  Led by the theoretical discussion above we consider 
inequality measured at two points, when the children were growing up and when their adult 
outcomes are measured. As we have focused on children who were born around 1960 we 
would ideally require income inequality measures for the 1970s.  The number of nations for 
which inequality data is available in the LIS increases as we consider more recent years.  We 
start with 1982, but for those countries where this is not available we use the earliest that is.  
LIS inequality data is available for 11 of the 12 countries which have a preferred income  , 
and 13 of the 42 countries included in Hertz et al. We supplement this information with 
income inequality taken from the World Bank dataset based on Deininger and Squire (1996), 
which is also used by Andrews and Leigh (2009). This provides inequality measures for the 
late 1970s/early 1980s, and covers 12 of the countries with information on income inequality 
and 22 of the countries in the Hertz et al study.  Information on inequality in the adult years is 
available for 1995 and 2000 from the LIS.
16
   
 Table 7 provides the correlations between income inequality and our measures of 
intergenerational immobility.  In all cases these are positive.  Nations with high inequality 
tend to have high persistence in income and education. There are some interesting variations 
in the strength of these correlations; these are worth noting although we must bear in mind 
the small sample sizes involved.   
                                                 
16
 An alternative source of inequality information is the share of top incomes, as brought together by Leigh 
(2007b); unfortunately these are only available for seven of the countries for which we have information on 
intergenerational income mobility.  
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 Taking the Table as a whole the majority of correlations are quite large (over 0.5), 
indicating a strong positive relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility.  It 
is notable that the correlation between educational mobility and inequality is very similar 
using the LIS and World Bank measures, eventhough the World Bank measure includes 
many more developing countries. There are some interesting differences across the measures, 
with our preferred income beta tending to be most strongly correlated with income inequality 
in adulthood while the education measure shows a larger association with inequality levels 
earlier in the relevant cohort’s life.  This is not surprising as the income beta is most likely to 
pick up the influence of labour market returns while the education measure is more dependent 
on the opportunities available to the cohort as young people.  
 There is no consistent evidence that the child poverty measure is more strongly 
correlated with immobility than are the general measures of inequality.  Indeed, rather 
counter-intuitively it appears that the measures related to income inequality at the top of the 
distribution (the 90-50 ratio) has a stronger association with immobility than the other 
measures of income inequality, although the size of these differences is too small for us to 
discriminate such patterns with any certainty.  
 Our theoretical discussion of the relationship between inequality and mobility 
highlighted two possible mechanisms.  One was that inequality and immobility tend to be 
generated by the same factors and that we would therefore expect the two to be correlated at 
the end of the process (when the second-generation are adults). The second is that inequality 
in childhood inhibits equality of opportunity.   The evidence presented in Table 7 indicates 
that it is inequality in childhood that matters for both income and education persistence while 
our preferred income mobility estimates are also very strongly correlated with inequality in 
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adulthood. This is because intergenerational income mobility is influenced by the adult 
returns to characteristics such as education and occupation.
 17
  
 Figures 6a and 6b show the relationship between the preferred beta and the gini-
coefficient in the early 1980s and in 1995. These figures reveal why the correlation with 
income mobility is stronger for inequality measured in 1995 than in the early 1980s.  The two 
key observations seem to be Denmark, for which inequality fell by about an eighth to match 
the low level of intergenerational persistence, and Britain where inequality rose by 25 percent 
over the period.  One should be cautious in interpreting these results as a consequence, 
especially given the uncertainty about the British estimate of beta.  
 This preliminary analysis of the relationship between inequality and mobility has 
indicated several interesting pieces of evidence. 1) There is the expected relationship between 
inequality and mobility.  2) The relationship between mobility and poverty is not driving this, 
inequality at the top is important as well.  3) Inequality in childhood has a strong negative 
relationship with both of the measures of equality of opportunity, but income mobility is also 
affected by inequality in adulthood.  
 
5.2 Educational Investment  
Solon (2004) highlights the importance of the progressivity of educational expenditure as a 
factor leading to greater mobility, although as noted above complementarity between public 
and private investments may mean that state involvement is mobility-reducing. 
 We are rather limited in the way we can operationalise this concept. The OECD 
Education at a Glance provides a large amount of information on education spending, such 
as the proportion of spending coming from private and public sources. However this 
                                                 
17
 Given our discussion of the impact of changes in inequality on the intergenerational elasticity (page 7) we 
might expect that the beta will be closely related to the ratio of inequality in 1995 to inequality in 1982.  In fact 
this correlation is 0.4 (on 16 observations).  It seems that the relationship with inequality in the son’s generation 
is not driven by this.   
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information is not available for the 1970s.  Instead we use information from Barro and Lee’s 
(1994) international panel dataset.  This provides Government education spending as a 
proportion of GDP, for both total and recurring expenditures.  This measure will confound 
the level of total spending relative to GDP with the extent to which spending on the education 
is carried out by Government. We take average figures from 1965-1969 (the primary school 
years for the 1960 cohort) and 1970-1974 (the early secondary school years) and once again 
correlate these with our measures of mobility. 
 Table 8 shows the expected negative relationship between education spending and 
intergenerational persistence.  Those countries which devote more of their income to public 
spending on human capital investment tend to be more mobile.  This correlation is slightly 
stronger with the income beta than with the education correlation, and these two variables are 
graphed in Figure 7. There is no consistent pattern for which measure of spending is most 
strongly correlated. 
 The international correlations have tended to support Becker’s prediction about the 
relationship between educational investment and mobility. However, this is in contrast to 
recent papers which empirically test this relationship using US only data. Grawe (2007) uses 
state level variation in pupil-teacher ratios and mobility to assess this relationship and finds 
that states with lower pupil-teacher ratios tend to have less mobility. This finding is also 
confirmed by Parman (2008) for a more specific setting; improved school access tended to 
lead to reduced mobility in early-20
th
 century Iowa.   A possible explanation between the 
conflict between international and within US findings is that there is a strong relationship 
between education spending and other important variables across countries.  For example the 
correlation between the gini coefficient and education spending is in the region of -0.3 to -
0.5.  Unfortunately we do not have enough data to robustly compare the influence of 
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individual variables and this is an argument for the increased use of innovative approaches 
which do not rely entirely on international comparisons.  
 
5.3 Returns to Education 
A further prediction from Solon is that income mobility will be weaker when the returns to 
education are larger. Recall the relationship between intergenerational income mobility in 
country (  ) and the correlation in education across generations ( ). Clearly the return to 
education for the child has a positive relationship with the income  .  We might also suspect 
that    will have a positive link to the return to education as better educated parents will 
have a greater incentive to invest their extra resources in their children’s education if the 
returns to this are higher.  
 Table 9 gives correlations between our mobility measures and the returns to education 
as listed in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).  Two measures are used, the average return 
to a year of education and the return to higher education.   The higher education measure is 
more strongly related to mobility than the average measure. This could be interpreted as 
being because higher education is the most important route for intergenerational 
persistence/mobility, but it may also be the case that the higher education return is subject to 
less measurement error across countries.   Our predictions concerning the relative strength of 
correlations with different measures of mobility are also found to be accurate.  Both measures 
of returns are correlated more strongly with income mobility than with educational mobility.  
This is because income mobility is influenced by income returns through the final outcome 
(earnings) while educational mobility will only be influenced by returns because of the 
incentives to invest. 
 Figure 10 shows a scatter-plot of the relationship between higher education returns 
and the income beta. This graph provides a clue as to why the income and education rankings 
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differ for Germany; Germany has a low return to education compared with Italy and France. 
The trend results reported in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos show that Germany has 
experienced a falling return to education which would also lead to a lower   relative to  .  
 
6. Conclusions – How much can we learn from international comparisons of social 
mobility? 
As with many other papers on intergenerational income mobility this paper has pointed to 
some important gaps in our knowledge. We can only find high quality estimates of income 
persistence for 12 nations, and we cannot be confident about how to rank the mobility of 
these nations.  It is therefore essential that longitudinal datasets continue to be developed and 
updated and that administrative income registers are exploited wherever possible. Politicians’ 
interest in social mobility shows no sign of waning and it is essential that researchers 
continue to offer up-to-date estimates of equality of economic opportunity for as many 
nations as possible.  
 In light of our current knowledge, this paper suggests that findings on 
intergenerational income and education persistence point to a similar ranking of countries. It 
seems that for economists interested in the intergenerational transmission of economic status 
education mobility provides a reasonable guide when data on income is unavailable or 
unreliable. We find South America, other developing nations and southern Europe at the 
more persistent end and the Nordic nations consistently exhibiting high mobility.  Father’s 
social class is less good at tapping into the factors that shape economic success in the next 
generation, but that is not to say that it is not interesting in its own right.  
 Our examination of the factors generating differences in mobility provides some 
explanations for the international rankings that we find.  Lower mobility in both income and 
education tends to be correlated with greater inequality, lower educational spending and 
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higher returns to education. Our results on the relationship between inequality and mobility 
also point towards some other conclusions.  The first is that inequality in childhood/youth is 
strongly related to both education and earnings persistence, while measures of inequality in 
adulthood are more strongly related to earnings persistence. These findings work against the 
hypothesis that inequality and mobility only vary together because they are driven by the 
same processes.  A second finding is that inequality at the top end of the distribution is more 
strongly linked to mobility than inequality at the bottom; it is not simply differences in child 
poverty that drives the inequality-mobility relationship. This is worth bearing in the mind for 
the UK where most measures of inequality have levelled off since 1997 but top income 
shares have continued to rise (Brewer et al 2008). These results also appear to chime with the 
recent literature on non-linearities in intergenerational income persistence (Bratsberg, 2007 
and Björklund, Roine and Waldenström, 2010), which finds strong income correlations at the 
very top of the parental income distribution, where incomes are very unequal.  
 The finding that countries with greater education spending have more mobility also 
has obvious policy implications. However, one should be cautious about assuming that any 
rise in spending relative to GDP will have a positive effect on mobility; we do not know 
enough at this stage about how the money must be spent to be effective. 
 Coming to our third explanatory variable, the returns to education, it is not obvious 
that Governments should seek to reduce this as an end in itself.  However it is the case that as 
more young people become highly qualified and educational opportunities are expanded the 
returns are likely to fall due to a rise in supply.  An even expansion in educational 
qualifications across all family backgrounds will therefore have a ‘double whammy’ effect on 
mobility, reducing the heritability of education and the reward to education in terms of 
income. 
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 In order to derive more robust policy recommendations we would need evidence that 
when education spending, inequality, and education returns change the rate of mobility 
changes, with sufficient observations to allow us to unpack the influence of different 
variables. Some evidence on this comes from Blanden et al (2004) who find a fall in mobility 
as inequality widened in the UK. However, a more persuasive assessment of these questions 
would require a large panel dataset to link changes in mobility across countries to changes in 
our other variables of interest.   
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Figure 1: Preferred Intergenerational Income Parameters 
 
Sources for these estimates are listed in Table 2 and Appendix Table 1. Lines give 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2: Parameters from Erikson and Goldthorpe Social Class Fluidity Model 
 
 
Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) Table 11.1 
 
 
Figure 3: Parameters from Social Class Fluidity Models from Breen (2004) 
 
 
Source: Breen (2004)  Figure 3.3. With thanks to Richard Breen for providing these figures.  
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Figure 4: Parents-Child Correlation in Years of Schooling from Hertz et al (2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Income and Educational Persistence Compared 
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Figure 6: Associations between the Income Beta and Gini-coefficient 
a) Early 1980s 
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Figure 7: Association between Income Beta and Education Expenditure 
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Figure 8: Relationship between the Income Beta and  
the Return to Higher Education 
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Table 1: the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero Social Class Schema 
I + II Service class Professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; 
supervisors of non-manual workers 
III Routine non-
manual workers 
Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales 
personnel; other rank-and-file service workers 
IVa + b Petty 
bourgeoisie 
Small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees 
IVc Farmers Farmers, small holders and other self-empoyed workers in primary production 
V + VI Skilled 
workers 
Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual 
workers 
VIIa Non-skilled 
workers 
Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.) 
VIIb Agricultural 
labourers 
Agricultural and other workers in primary production 
 
Table 2: Preferred estimates of income mobility 
Country Source Elasticity 
Brazil Dunn (2007) (scaled) 0.52 (0.011) 
US Solon (1992) 0.41 (0.09) 
UK  Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) 
(scaled) and averaged with Nicoletti 
and Ermisch (2007) 
0.37 (0.05) 
Italy Piraino (2007) (scaled) 0.33  (0.026) 
France Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) (scaled) 0.32 (0.045) 
Norway Nilsen et al (forthcoming) 0.25 (0.006) 
Australia Leigh (2007a) revised as in 
Björklund and Jäntti (2008) 
0.25 (.080)  
Germany Vogel (2008) 0.24 (.053) 
Sweden Björklund and Chadwick (2003) 0.24 (0.011) 
Canada Corak and Heisz (1999) 0.23 (0.01) 
Finland Pekkarinen et al. (2006) 
Österbacka (2001) 
Averaged as in Björklund and Jäntti 
(2008) 
0.20 (.020) 
Denmark Hussein et al (2008) 0.14 (0.004) 
 
Note: Estimates based on Instrumental Variables regressions are scaled down by 0.75 to 
allow a legitimate comparison to be made with those based on OLS and time averaging.  This 
reflects the difference in these estimates found for the US in Solon (1992) and Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997).  Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) assert that their results are less subject to IV bias 
than others put forward in the literature and offer as evidence the fact that they lay between 
the OLS and IV estimates in Dearden, Machin and Reed.  As a consequence we do not scale 
these estimates, although we appreciate that this is controversial.  
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Table 3: Measures of Association in Years of Schooling 
 
 Elasticity Rank Correlation Rank 
Peru 0.88 6 0.66 1 
Ecuador 0.72 12 0.61 2 
Panama 0.73 11 0.61 3 
Chile 0.64 18 0.60 4 
Brazil 0.95 4 0.59 5 
Colombia 0.80 8 0.59 6 
Nicaragua 0.82 7 0.55 7 
Indonesia 0.78 9 0.55 8 
Italy 0.67 17 0.54 9 
Slovenia 0.54 27 0.52 10 
Egypt 1.03 2 0.50 11 
Hungary 0.61 20 0.49 12 
Sri Lanka 0.61 19 0.48 13 
Pakistan 1.00 3 0.46 14 
USA 0.46 33 0.46 15 
Switzerland 0.49 30 0.46 16 
Ireland 0.70 15 0.46 17 
South Africa 0.69 16 0.44 18 
Poland 0.48 31 0.43 19 
Vietnam 0.58 23 0.40 20 
Philippines 0.41 36 0.40 21 
Belgium 0.41 35 0.40 22 
Estonia 0.54 28 0.40 23 
Sweden 0.58 26 0.40 24 
Ghana 0.71 13 0.39 25 
Ukraine 0.37 40 0.39 26 
East Timor 1.27 1 0.39 27 
Bangladesh 0.58 25 0.38 28 
Slovakia 0.61 21 0.37 29 
Czech Republic 0.44 34 0.37 30 
Netherlands 0.58 24 0.36 31 
Norway 0.40 38 0.35 32 
Nepal 0.94 5 0.35 33 
New Zealand 0.40 37 0.33 34 
Finland 0.48 32 0.33 35 
Northern Ireland 0.59 22 0.32 36 
Great Britain 0.71 14 0.31 37 
Malaysia 0.38 39 0.31 38 
Denmark 0.49 29 0.30 39 
Kyrgyztan 0.20 42 0.28 40 
China (rural) 0.34 41 0.20 41 
Ethiopia (rural) 0.75 10 0.10 42 
Source: Table 2 of Hertz et al (2007)  
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Table 4: Correlations between different intergenerational mobility measures 
 
 Preferred 
Income   
E & G   Breen   
(1990s) 
E & G   
 
0.035 [8]   
Breen   
(1990s) 
 
-0.315  [5] 0.687 [8]  
Years of 
education 
correlation 
0.732 [6] -0.122 
[10] 
-0.526 [7] 
 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
 
Table 5:  Reconciling US and UK Results for Income and Education Persistence 
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*(1 )
( )
ci pi
Edp
pi
Cov y v
R
Var v

 
2
( , )1
. *
( )
ic pi
Edp
p pi
Cov v Ed
R
Var Ed
 
UK .301 (.847*.349)*.142
=. 042 
.223 .033 
US .480 
 
(1.067*.470)*.195
= .098 
 
.332 .050 
US-
UK 
.181 .056 .109 .017 
Notes: 
See page 18 in text for notation. 
UK data is derived from the British Cohort Study of those born in 1970. The sample is 2595 sons who have 
information on parental income (at ages 10 and/or 16), individual earnings (at ages 30 and/or 34) and education 
and social class for both generations.   is from a regression of averaged earnings on averaged parental income. 
US data is from the PSID and it is used to match the BCS data as closely as possible. Years of birth for sons are 
restricted to 1965-1975.  The number of observations used is 355. 
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Table 6:  Reconciling US and UK Results for Income and Social Class Persistence 
   ˆ ˆ( , )
ˆ( )
p pi c ci
p pi
Cov Soc Soc
Var Soc
 

 
2
SocpR  
*( , )
( )
ici p
pi
Cov y
Var


 
ˆ( , )
ˆ( )
ci p pi
p pi
Cov Soc
Var Soc
 

 
UK .301 .356 .221 .232 .181 
US .480 .313 .254 .410 .373 
     
   
2
ˆ ˆ( , )
*
ˆ( )
p pi c ci
Socp
p pi
Cov Soc Soc
R
Var Soc
 

 
*
2
( , )
*(1 )
( )
ci pi
Socp
pi
Cov y
R
Var



 
2
ˆ( , )
*
ˆ( )
pi p pi
Socp
p pi
Cov Soc
R
Var Soc
 

 
UK .301 
 
.079 .181 .040 
US .480 
 
.079 .306 .095 
US-
UK 
.181 .000 .125 .055 
Notes:  
See page 18 in text for notation. 
See Table 4 for information on data. 
The social class variable in the US data is the 8-category NS-SEC (Rose and Pevalin, 2005) for both generations 
(measured around age 34 for sons, and when the son was around 14 for fathers).  
The NS-SEC is used for sons in British BCS data (age 34) and a modified Goldthorpe scheme is used to 
measure social class when the son is 10 (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007).  
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Table 7: Correlations between inequality and intergenerational mobility 
 
 Preferred 
Income   
Years of 
education 
correlation 
LIS measures  
early-mid 1980s 
  
Income gini 0.58 [11] 0.63  [13] 
Atkinson coefficient 
 =0.5 
0.58 [11] 0.62  [13] 
90/10 0.59 [11] 0.56 [13] 
90/50 0.65 [11] 0.64 [13] 
80/20 0.61 [11] 0.51 [13] 
Child poverty 0.64 [11] 0.54 [13] 
   
World Bank 
measure late 1970s 
– early 1980s 
  
Income gini 0.64 [12] 0.49 [22] 
   
Later LIS 
inequality 
  
Gini 1995 0.87 [11] 0.49 [13] 
Gini 2000 0.84 [11] 0.33 [15] 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets.   The 11 countries 
used to calculate the correlations in the first column are those in Table 1 apart from Brazil, which joined the LIS 
in the most recent wave.  The 13 countries with information in the LIS and in the Hertz study are Switzerland, 
US, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, UK, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and Belgium.  
The world bank measures is available for all of these apart from the last two plus New Zealand, the Czech 
Republic, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt, Philippines, Nepal, Malaysia and China.  
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Table 8: Correlations between education spending and intergenerational mobility 
 
 Education 
spend % GDP 
1965-1969 
Education 
spend % GDP 
1970-1974 
Recurring 
education 
spend % GDP 
1965-1969 
Recurring 
education 
spend % GDP 
1970-1974 
Preferred Income 
  
-0.566 [12] -0.627 [12] -0.594 [12] -0.573 [12] 
Years of 
education 
correlation 
-0.462 [21] -0.498 [22] -0.434 [23] -0.487 [22] 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
 
 
Table 9: Correlations between education returns and intergenerational mobility 
 
 Returns to each year of 
education 
Returns to higher 
education 
Preferred Income   0.625 [13] 0.826 [9] 
Years of education correlation 0.278 [32] 0.318 [22] 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
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Table A1: Summary of international literature on intergenerational persistence for sons 
Study Country  Data source Son’s outcome variable Father’s income variable Approach to 
measurement error  
ˆ  ˆ  
        
Solon (1992) USA Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics 
Log annual earnings in 1984, 
ages 25–33. 
Log annual earnings, 1967–72. Five-year average of 
father’s earnings. 
  0.41   (0.09)  
   Log annual earnings in 1984, 
ages 25–33. 
Log annual earnings in 1967. Father’s education 
used as an 
instrumental 
variable. 
  0.53 (0.014)  
Zimmerman 
(1992) 
USA National Longitudinal 
Survey 
Log annual earnings in 1981, 
ages 29–39. 
Log annual earnings over 1966–
71. 
Four-year average of 
father’s earnings. 
  0.54   (0.08)  
   Log annual earnings in 1981, 
ages 29–39. 
Log annual earnings in 1971. Duncan Index used 
as instrumental 
variable.  
  0.67 (0.15)  
Mazumder (2005) USA Survey of Income and 
Program Participation 
matched to Social 
Security Record 
Log of average earnings over 
1995–98; sons born 1963–68.  
Log annual earnings over 1970–
85. 
16-year average of 
father’s earnings. 
  0.61 (0.10)  
Couch and Dunn 
(1997) 
Germany 
and the 
USA 
German Socio-
Economic Panel and 
PSID 
Log annual earnings averaged 
over 1984–89, sons on average 
aged 23 in Germany, 25 in the 
USA. 
Log annual earnings averaged 
over 1984–89. 
Five-year averages Germany:   
0.11 (0.06) 
USA:           
0.13 (0.06) 
 
Wiegand (1997) Germany German Socio-
Economic Panel 
Log monthly earnings in 1994; 
sons aged 27–33. 
Log monthly earnings averaged 
over 1984–89. 
Five-year average  0.32           
(0.07) 
 
Vogel (2008) Germany German Socio-
Economic Panel 
Sons observed in 2003 at ages 
25-50 with average 34.4. Thus 
they were born: 1953-78. 
Fathers observed at  ages 27-56 
with average 43.4.   
Five-year average 0.246 (.084)  
Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997) 
Sweden 
and the 
USA 
Swedish Level of 
Living Survey and 
PSID 
Log annual earnings in 1990, 
sons born 1952–61.  
Father’s earnings predicted from 
education and occupation in a 
separate dataset. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Sweden:      
0.36 (0.11) 
USA: 
0.52 (0.14) 
Sweden: 0.29 
(0.09) 
USA: 0.41 
(0.11) 
Gustafsson (1994) Sweden Matched register and Four-year average of log Father’s individual income in Four-year average  0.14              
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tax data, for fathers in 
Stockholm 1955  
individual income; sons born 
1939–45.  
1955.  (0.07)  
Österberg (2000) Sweden Matched register data Sons aged 25 and over in 
1990, earnings averaged 1990-
1992 
Fathers’ average earnings in 
1978-1980 
Three-year average .129 (.011)  
Björklund and 
Chadwick (2003) 
Sweden Matched register data Sons born 1962-1965,  
earnings observed in 1999. 
Father’s income averaged from 
1970-1975 
Five-year average 0.24 (0.01)  
Hirvonen (2007) Sweden Matched register data Sons born 1960-1966 earnings 
averaged over 1997-2000 
Parental income averaged 1970-
1975. 
Five-year average 0.275 (0.004)  
Österbacka (2001) Finland  Finnish quinquenniel 
population census 
Log average annual earnings 
in 1985, 1995, 2000; sons born 
1950–60.  
Log average annual earnings in 
1970 and 1975.  
Two-year average 
but five years apart  
 0.13        
(0.005) 
0.156 (.006) 
Pekkarinen et al. 
(2009) 
Finland Finnish quinquenniel 
population census 
Son’s earnings in 2000 at ages 
34-40, born 1960-66. 
Father’s earnings averaged over 
1970,1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 at 
an unknown age. 
Average over 5 
periods, in total 20 
years apart.  
0.23-0.30 
(around 0.020) 
 
Nilsen et al 
(forthcoming) 
Norway Matched register data Sons earnings averaged over 
ages 36-40; born 1959-1962. 
Father’s earnings averaged over 
different periods.  Fathers born 
1927-1942. 
Time averaging, as 
reported in next 
column 
67-71: .338 
72-76: .282 
77-81: .253  
82-86: .163 
67-91: .292 
 
Hussein, Munk 
and Bonke (2008) 
Denmark Matched register data Son’s annual earnings in 2000 
at ages 30-40, born 1960-
1970. 
Father’s aunnual earnings 
averaged over 1984-1988 when 
aged 30-66. 
Average over 5 
years 
0.136 (0.004) Not reported 
Corak and Heisz 
(1999) 
Canada Matched income tax 
data 
Log annual earnings in 1995; 
sons born 1963–66. 
Father’s log annual earnings 
averaged over 1978–82. 
Five-year average of 
father’s earnings 
 0.23          
(0.01) 
 
Atkinson 
(1981) 
UK Follow-up of 
Rowntree York 
Sample 
Log weekly earnings at survey 
date (1975–78). 
Log weekly earnings in 1950. None  0.36           
(0.03) 
 
Dearden et al. 
(1997) 
UK National Child 
Development Survey 
Log weekly earnings at age 33 
for a cohort born in 1958. 
Father’s log weekly earnings 
when son aged 16.  
Instrumental 
variables using 
father’s education 
and social class 
 0.58          
(0.06) 
OLS results 
are 0.24 (.027)  
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Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2007) 
UK British Household 
Panel Survey 
Average log earnings over 
1991-2003 for sons born 
1952-1970 
Information on occupation, 
education and age of fathers used 
to predict their earnings. 
Prediction is from older men in 
1991 or as close to as possible. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
0.29 (0.06)       
Lefranc and 
Trannoy (2005) 
France French Education–
Training–Employment 
surveys 1964–93 
(FQP) 
Log annual earnings for sons 
aged 30–40, 1993 FQP. 
Information on father’s education 
and social class used to predict 
earnings from similar-aged men 
in FQP.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Approx. 0.4  
Piraino (2007) Italy Bank of Italy Survey 
on Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW) 
Log annual earnings in 2000, 
2002, 2004 for 30–45 year-
olds whose fathers were born 
between 1927 and 1949.  
Information on father’s 
education, employment status, 
occupation and region used to 
predict income from men in 
1977–79 SHIW aged 30–50. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
 0.435         
(0.035) 
 
Mocetti (2007) Italy SHIW as above Log annual earnings in 2000, 
2002, 2004 for 30–50 year-
olds. 
Information on education, sector, 
region and occupational 
qualification used to predict 
income from men in 1977–80 
aged 30–50.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
 0.499        
(0.051) 
 
Leigh (2007a)  Australia Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in 
Australia 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics 
Log annual earnings in 2004 
for sons aged 25-54.  
Average earnings in 2004 for 
men in father’s occupation where 
father’s occupation is recalled by 
adult son.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Australia: 
0.2-0.3 
US: 0.4-0.6 
Correlation 
likely smaller 
than elasticity 
Dunn (2007)  Brazil PNAD cross-sectional 
data 
Log annual earnings in 1996 
for sons aged 25-34.  
 
Earnings are predicted from 
father’s education, education and 
earnings relationship is obtained 
from males aged 30-50 in the 
1976 survey. 
 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
0.688 (0.014)  
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Figure A1: The relationship between our two measures of educational mobility 
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Source: Correlations are from Hertz et al (2008) and Chevalier et al (2009). The correlation 
between two measures is .49, regression line has slope 0.45. If Chile is excluded the 
correlation and coefficients reduce to around 0.33.  
 
